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well worthy of republication. Judging from this first number *The Monist* bids fair to be a valuable instrument in the spread of philosophic and scientific thought. W. H. B.

The Ethics of Evolution J. H. HYSLOP. New Englander and Yale Review. Sept. 1890.

The evolution of which Prof. Hyslop speaks is that of the animal series, with its struggle for existence and survival of the fittest; its ethical principle is the right of the strongest. That such an ethical ideal would shiver civilization, if once it should be practiced, can readily be admitted; and by citations of early and later opinions of Huxley, Spencer, Darwin and Carlyle the author endeavors to show the power of this ideal to force itself upon the minds of those that have to do with it—that "nature is a Medusa head on which no moralist can look and live." The theory of evolution then furnishes no principle of ethics which can for a moment be accepted; "the whole of man's moral achievements have been effected by *putting limits to the struggle for existence*," his moral ideals must come from elsewhere. Much that is here said of animal evolution is by no means true of that broader theory which would make the heroic revolt against nature spoken of by the author itself a product of evolution; but this he seems to complain would rob the theory of its force as a controversial weapon.

Philosophy in Homeopathy. C. S. MACK, M. D. Gross and Delbridge, Chicago, 1890. pp. 174.

In the several addresses, etc., which make up this little book are developed with some repetition the author's idea of the rationale of homeopathy. There are facts, he believes, beyond inductive science which are endorsed and substantiated by the reason of man, and from which he may proceed deductively in the development of the art of medicine. Such a principle is the homeopathic *similia similibus curantur*. By a process of logical exclusion he shows that there are no other methods of cure than that so stated. By "cure," however, he means not the recovery of the patient, which may take place of itself when the exciting cause of his trouble is removed (a method of treatment often justifiable), but the production of such a change in the vital processes as shall set them right. When he would explain how "*similia*," as he calls it, secures this change, it is a mystic and Swedenborgian explanation that he furnishes. The author's spirit is non-polemical, but we must tell him that his method of deduction from principles other than those inductively established has been the mother of numberless follies in medicine already, and that the less of such philosophy in homeopathy the better for it.

Ueber die Methoden der Messung des Bewusstseinsumfanges. W. WUNDT. Philos. Studien, Bd. VI, H. 2, S. 250; 1890.

In this short paper Prof. Wundt discusses the methods of measuring the *Umfang* or extent of consciousness and replies to the criticisms of Schumann on his method (see review of Schumann's paper in this JOURNAL, Vol. III, p. 290). The question of the extent of consciousness in this sense is not very different from that of how many simple ideas can be present in the mind at one time. Prof. Wundt's method, as applied by his pupil Dietze, was in principle this: a series of regularly timed sounds are produced; as each member of the series is given, it rises in the focus of consciousness, and then giving place to the next, it advances by degrees toward the limit of consciousness, which it finally passes. If by any means it is possible then to find the number of sounds in a series of which the first is just on the point of disappear-

ing when the last is just in the focus of consciousness, that number would be a measure of the extent of consciousness. In Wundt's method that number is found by finding the longest series that can be accurately compared with a slightly longer or shorter series (of course without counting), on the hypothesis that two series cannot be compared accurately when they are so long as to extend beyond the bounds of consciousness. The essence of Schumann's criticism, if we understand him, is that each sound as it comes is commonly responded to by some sort of a muscular contraction, and that after a few repetitions of the first or standard series the *number* of muscular contractions becomes established, unconsciously of course, and that same number is repeated when the second or comparison series is given. If the muscular contractions cease before the second series is ended the series is judged to be longer; if they over-run, the series is judged to be shorter. [For brevity we may call this adjustment of the muscular responses an unconscious counting of them.] A comparison of the number of sounds in two series, made in this way would be as useless for determining the extent of consciousness, as one made by conscious counting; what would really be measured would be how many sounds a man can count unconsciously. To this Prof. Wundt replies that he observes a clear difference in the process of comparison between series that can be compared as wholes and those that cannot be so compared. The line of demarkation between series that can be compared with some certainty, and those where the comparison is made uncertain by increasing length, is sharply drawn; as it should be if there is a change such as Prof. Wundt observes in the method of comparison. To the reviewer's mind however, he fails to answer satisfactorily Schumann's main point namely that the series are compared by means of what is little less than unconscious counting.

E. C. S.